

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President-Designate  
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to  
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE: September 6, 1974

PLACE: Oval Office  
The White House

SUBJECTS: Visits; 40 Committee; NSC Meeting on Israeli Requests;  
Preparation for Rabin Visit

Kissinger: On the Schmidt visit: He couldn't come in October and proposed September 25. I suspect French mischief. You shouldn't be pushed. I think you should go back to the original schedule.

President: We shouldn't interrupt Leone.

Kissinger: That would be very bad taste. If he can't come in October we will tell him we will try to find a day in December.

About a press conference: If you have one next week, I won't.

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President: Next Friday, I think.

Kissinger: I think inviting the cosmonauts to a picnic would be overdoing it a bit. Dobrynin would make a big deal of it, and this is the sort of thing the French put in speeches.

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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

State Dept. review complete

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3

President: Let me know Monday. If the committees were informed it shouldn't be a problem.

Kissinger: They were regularly informed.

President: Let's ride it out and we'll see.

Kissinger: We have to have these things. We'll need them more for Portugal, Spain, and so on.

At our meeting today I will go into the Israeli arms requests, then CIA will brief, then I will explain the strategy. The CIA will have charts showing the forces the Arabs can bring to bear.

What is it we are trying to do? What are the others trying to do? What are some of the problems?

We want to guarantee the security of Israel, but we want to prevent the coalescence of the Arab states -- that would create an unmanageable situation for us. We also want to prevent the resurgence of Soviet influence. We want to prevent an Israeli-Arab war and the consequent confrontation with the Soviet Union. If negotiations stall, or if there is a war, there will be an embargo. That would push Europe over the cliff.

→ The Europeans' response to the Cyprus business shows their mood. There would be a massive anti-U.S. blow-up. The same will happen in Japan. The Soviet Union has suffered because they operated too cautiously in the past. They were too much in the middle. They won't be caught doing too little again. That makes an Israeli victory more dangerous than an Israeli defeat. Last time we had a massive airlift and a massive showdown, and we would have lost the ability to present ourselves to the Arabs as a means to a solution.

As for the Israelis, another war would result in world pressure for the '67 borders. It would be tough for the U.S. alone to resist, and the result would be demoralizing like what was done to Czechoslovakia in '38.

We have been giving the Arabs the feeling that each of them had something to gain--Egypt immediately; Jordan in the mid-term, and Syria somewhat later. The Syrians know that Israel doesn't want to move; they also know that the more the others are satisfied the more isolated they will be, so they will work to lump everything together. With

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